Mandatory occupational retirement savings : towards a program design agenda for Hong Kong by DIXON, John
Lingnan University
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working
Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
心
1995
Mandatory occupational retirement savings :
towards a program design agenda for Hong Kong
John DIXON
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the
Retirement Security Law Commons
This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中心 at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Recommended Citation
Dixon, J. (1995). Mandatory occupational retirement savings: Towards a program design agenda for Hong Kong (CPPS Working
Papers Series no.17). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/14
Working Paper Series 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
No. 17 (2/95) CPPS 
MANDATORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT 
SA VINGS : TOW ARDS A PROGRAM DESIGN 
AGENDA FOR HONG KONG 
by 
John Dixon 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
Hong Kong 
香港嶺南學院
社會科學院
No. 17 (2月5) CPPS 
MANDATORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT 
SA VINGS : TOW ARDS A PROGRAM DESIGN 
AGENDA FOR HONG KONG 
by 
John Dixon 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
Hong Kong 
1995 
MANDATORY OCCUPATIONAL RETlREMENT SAVINGS: 
TOW ARDS A PROGRAM DESIGN AGENDA FOR HONG KONG 
CPPS and CAPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical comment. Opinions 
expressed in them are the author' s and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Editorial 
Boards or Lingnan College. These papers may be freely circulated but they are not to be quoted 
without the written pennission of the author. Please address comments and suggestions to the author 
or the series editors. 
Editorial Board 
Cent1'e fo1' Asian Pacific Studies: 
時
n
內心切
Lum
gh
閃叮
叮叫
CF1
叭叭
bAnjMN U.YY
川m
a--v.v nu
、ia
BKED 
:-
vlri
付人
VA
DD
恥
D
Cent1'e fo1' Public Policy Studies: 
Dr. Che Wai Kin 
Mr. John Dixon 
Prof. Y. Y. Kueh 
P1'of. David Wein1er 
。 John Dixon 
John Dixon is Head of Department of Social Sciences, Lingnan College, Hong 
Kong. 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
15 Stubbs Road 
Hong Kong 
TeI: 2572 2226 
Fax: 2891 7940 
The Patten administration has been lurching around in recent years 
searching for a community consensus to legitimate reform of Hong Kong's 
aged income support system. It seems to consider that the existing system, 
which combines social assistance (means-tested age pensions and benefits) 
with social allowances (universal benefits to categories of the aged 
population) (Dixon & Chow, 1992), will be unable, alone, to meet the 
income-security needs of the elderly in Hong Kong after 1997. The reason 
for this concern can only be speculated upon, but perhaps it reflects a belief, 
or indeed an expectation, that the future Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region government might not give aged income support the priority 
needed to protect the basic living standards of Hong Kong' s aged population, 
given the almost inevitable increase in government expenditure on the 
aged that ,vill result from Hong Kong's ageing population in the years to 
come. 
The dual purpose of this paper is: 
• to provide a context for the Patten administration's latest, and 
perhaps its last, aged income-support system reform prescription 
in terms of possible policy goals, the broad spectrum of income-
support strategies available, and the internationally-recognised 
minimum standards for social security programs; and 
• to set out a specific program design agenda related to program 
coverage, withdrawal contingencies, program financing and 
program administration that the Patten administration needs to 
address when developing its latest proposed aged income-support 
program. 
AGED INCOME-SUPPORT REFORM 
Under the rubric of income support for the aged comes a wide variety 
of mandatory public measures that provide cash payments, and perhaps in-
kind benefits, in the event of an individual's earning power permanently 
ceasing due to retirement or the attainment of a designated age (Dixon, 
1986). These public measures (or programs) can be designed to meet any of 
many policy goals. 
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Aged Income-Support Policy Goals 
There are a wide variety of sometimes conflicting aged income-support 
goals that might be sought by a government seeking to introduce an aged 
income-support program (Dixon. 1994), including: 
• to ameliorate poverty amongst the existing aged; 
to prevent poverty amongst the aged in the fu ture; 
• to achieve a specific form of income redistribution, such as: 
• from employers to their employees upon retirement; 
• from higher income groups to the aged in poverty; 
• from current employees to the current aged; or 
• from current employees to themselves at retirelnent; and 
• to minimise (or maximise) the current or future cost burden of 
aged income support on: 
• government; 
• employers; or 
• employees. 
The social norms that infiltrate and mould a society's perceptions of 
,,,,hat constitutes the appropriate set of goals for its aged income support 
system are the result of an accumulation of preferences generated by a 
people as they shape their specific society. The dominant set of values that 
determine how a society views aged income-support is a crucial factor in the 
determining the broad contours of the building blocks that the social security 
technocrats sculpt and adorn to construct their systems. 
Aged Income-Support Models 
A government seeking to design an aged income-support program to 
achieve specific policy goals in the context of an existing system of means-
tested and universal-categorical age pensions and benefits can eclecticly draw 
upon the features of three major income-support models: mandatory 
retirement insurance (social insurance) or mandatory occupational 
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retirement savings (national provident funds) and tax-minimising or tax-
deferring voluntary retirement benefit programs. 
Mandatory Retirement Insurance. This is an employment-related approach 
whereby benefit eligibility is usually based direct1y or indirect1y on satisfying 
either a minimum covered employment period or a minimum 
contribution period. The benefits provided upon retirement, or after the 
attainment of a designated age, are usually periodic cash pensions related to 
current or past earning or to past contributions paid, although uniform flat-
rate pensions and lump sum benefits can be paid. These benefits are 
financed entirely, or in part, by specific mandatory contributions (generally 
specified as a percentage of earnings) paid by participating employers and 
their covered employees usually to a publicly-administered fund , with, 
perhaps, a government subsidy, although privately-administered pension 
funds are not unknown (Ryser, 1992; Santamar泊， 1992). 
Mandatory Occupational Retirement Savings. Under this employment-
related approach participating employees and their covered employers must 
pay regular contributions to a publicly-administered provident fund , which 
are credited to a separate account maintained for each covered employee. 
The balance in those accounts attracts interest and is usually payable in a 
lump sum upon retirement, the attainment of a designated age, or some 
other designated event (such as death or emigration), although interim 
withdra\val right, borrowing rights, periodic disbursements and even 
annuities can be accommodated. 
Voluntary Retirement Benefit. Under this approach, employers, employees 
and individuals can be induced into a variety of voluntary retirement 
benefit programs by making them tax-minimising or tax-deferring 
mechanisms. There are two broad program categories. The first contains 
voluntary retirement insurance programs, which usually take the form of 
either private occupational superannuation (usually involving both 
employer and employee contributions and pension and/or lump-sum 
payments) or individual superannuation policies with insurance companies 
(usually involving lump-sum and/or pension payments). The second 
category contains voluntary retirement savings programs, which usually 
take the form of private occupational provident funds (usually involving 
both employer and employee contributions and lump-sum payments), 
individual retirement savings account with financial institutions, or 
retirement savings bonds. 
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The Patten Administration's Search for a Suitable Supplementary Aged 
Income-Support Program 
The policy development process that the Patten administration began 
in the early 1990s, in the hope of building a community consensus about the 
appropriate form that a supplementary aged income-support program 
should take, has been characterised by ill-defined policy goals and by the 
sequential proffering of alternative inadequately-specified income-support 
programs. Although there has been a conspicuous lack of well-defined 
policy goals, the Patten administration would seem to be shifting away from 
the long-standing Hong Kong policy goal of only seeking to ameliorate 
lnodestly aged poverty (with minimal vertical income-redistributive 
consequences and at the government's expense) towards embracing the goal 
of preventing, albeit in a modest way, the occurrence of such poverty some 
tÏ1ne long into the future (,,,, ith minimal inter-temporal vertical income-
redistributive consequences and not at the government's expense) . The 
willingness of the Patten administration to articulate only generic policy 
strategies (shifting from a privately-administered provident fund system to a 
pay-as-you-go social insurance system, and virtua11y back again) without 
specifying a11 the detailed program design features has not a110wed a 
complete analysis of these various income-support strategies to be 
undertaken. This applies to the latest, and perhaps last, policy prescription: 
a mandatory occupational retirement savings program (euphemistica11y 
called a lvfandatory Provident Fund system). 
MANDATORY OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT SA VINGS : 
AN INADEQUA TE AGED INCOME SUPPORT STRA TEGY 
Envisioned by the Patten administration is an employment-related, 
private-sector administered, mandatory occupational retirement saving 
program, which would operate in tandem with Hong Kong's existing aged 
income-support system (Willis, 1995). It would mandate most employees 
under the aged of 65 to contribute probably five per cent of their salaries, 
with matching employer contributions, subject to a (yet to be specified) salary 
floor and ceiling, to registered private provident funds under contract to 
their employers. There would be requirements for preservation and 
portability until these employees reach retirement age (presumably 65 years 
of age) except in the event of death, total disability and permanent departure 
from Hong Kong. A "residual pool scheme" would be established to ensure 
that coverage is available to those employees whose coverage is deemed to 
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be an unprofitab1e undertaking for registered private provident funds. 
These contributions, with accumu1ated interest 1ess administrative fees , 
vvou1d be paid to covered emp10yees upon their attairunent of a designated 
retirement age. 
Program administration wou1d be undertaken by the designated registered 
private provident funds , subject to a regu1atory regime that wou1d, at 1east, 
require the private provident fund industry to accept responsibility 
collective1y for any financia1 10sses incurred by a particu1ar private provident 
fund as a resu1t of theft, fraud or some other breach of the 1a\v by an 
emp10yee of tha t fund. 
The policy prescription being offered by the Patten administration 
presumes that acceptab1e aged inCOllì.e support can be provided by means of 
mandatory savings \vithout risk-pooling. In terms of the Internationa1 
Labour Office's (ILO's) Socia1 Security (Minimum Standard) Convention, 
1952, which provides a 1ong-standing, internationally accepted set of 
conservative benchmarks for the design of adequate socia1 security programs 
in both deve10ping and developed countries, mandatory occupational 
retirement savings programs provide inadequate aged income support 
(Dixon, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990 & 1993; Dixon & Chow, 1992). 
Lump Sum Benefits 
The 1952 ILO Convention endorses only the use of periodic payments, 
expressed as either a percentage of a beneficiary's previous earnings, for a 
particular period of tÍlne (artic1es 63 and 64) or an income-tested flat-rate 
"sufficient to maintain the fami1 y of the beneficiary in heal th and decency" 
(artic1e 65) to meet social security needs. The provision of lump-sum 
benefits is thus an inferior form of socia1 security payment because the 
payments are not determined in accordance with social security needs, rather 
they are the product of past savings. Because mandatory occupational 
retirement savings programs are unable to ensure that their beneficiaries use 
their 1ump-sum payments to provide for themse1ves a future source of 
income, they cannot guarantee that their beneficiaries do not quick1y become 
impoverished, as inflation eats away at their means of suppor t. Hence the 
ab i1ity of mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings programs to protect 
covered emp10yees in the event of the 10ss of their earning power after 
retirement depends on the efficacy of the 1ump-sum payment. The extent to 
which such payments can provide adequate aged income support depends 
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on the level of accumulated savings ava i1able for final withdravval, the uses 
to which that savings are put, and the rate of inflation. 
The Problem of Inadequate Savings. This is one of the major dilemmas 
confronting mandatory occupational retirement savings programs seeking 
to provide adequate aged income suppor t. The accumulated savings 
available for final withdrawal would be greater: 
• the higher the contribution rates payable; 
the higher the income to which that rate applies; 
• the longer the contribution period (or the shorter the periods 
of unemployment or uncovered employment); 
• the higher the interest accrued on that savings; 
. the smaller the administrative charges deducted from that 
savlngs; 
• the smaller proportion of outstanding (uncollected) 
contributions; and 
. the smaller any interim withdrawals (or unrepaid 
borrowings) permitted from that savings. 
One particular issue need to be highlighted in this context. The continuous 
contribution period that must elapse before covered employees can 
accumulate adequate savings to finance their retirement is some 25 years, on 
the rule-of-thumb basis that vvith a 10 per cent combined employer-
employee contribution rate it takes at least five years to accumulate savings 
equivalent to one year's salary and that the target income-replacement rate is 
25 percent. 
The Dispersal of Lump-Sum Payments. The way in which lump-sum 
payments are spent determines the extent to which this form of benefit 
provides adequate aged income support. The principle justification for a 
lump-sum payment is that it provides the beneficiary with the wherewithal 
to acquire income-generating assets, so as to avoid subsequent recourse to 
any form of social assistance. This does not, however, guarantee that the 
accumulated savings are used to this end. 
Inflation. The effectiveness of mandatory occupational retirement savings 
programs providing lump-sum payments as a means of providing adequate 
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aged income support is affected by inflation in two ways. First, any inflation 
occurring over the contribution period reduces the real value of the 
accumulated savings unless the net interest rate (that is, nominal interest 
rate less administrative charges) earned exceeds the inflation rate over that 
period. Second, any inflation occurring after the final lump-sum payment 
has been made reduces the real value of the benefits generated by its 
dispersal, which provides a clear incentive to divert this payment to current 
rather than to future consumption. 1n both situations, inflation diminishes 
the capacity of lump-sum payments to provide adequate aged income 
support. 
Employee Coverage 
The 1952 ILO's Convention established three alternative minimum 
coverage standards: not less than 20 per cent of all residents; all residents 
\vith means below a particular limit; or not less than 50 per cent of all 
en1ployees in industrial work places employing 20 persons or more. The 
envisioned mandatory occupational retirement savings program for Hong 
Kong will probably meet the third requirements within a reasonable period 
of time, given that the existing voluntary private provident funds have 
achieved a coverage of 30 per cent of the workforce (Willis, 1995). It must be 
recognised , however, that mandatory occupational retirement savings 
programs provide the most generous aged income support to those covered 
employees who have the highest incomes and who have not experienced 
periods of either unemployment, uncovered employment or absence from 
the workforce. Unquestionably, the less fortunate receive less income 
support, which is a product of the lack of risk-pooling. 
Distribution of Costs 
The 1952 ILO Convention requires that the costs of social security 
protection be met by means of contributions or taxes "in a manner of which 
avoid hardship to persons of small means" (article 67). The specification of a 
contribution floor under the envisioned mandatory occupational retirement 
savings program for Hong Kong would reduce the financial hardship caused 
by payment of the designated employee contributions by low-income 
covered employees. Yet it is this very group that is vulnerable and most 
likely to fall into the social assistance safety ne t. 
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INCOME-SUPPORT PROGRAM DESIGN PARAMETERS 
In proffering a mandatory occupational retirement savings program the 
Patten administration is following in the path of Australia, Chile and, more 
recent1y, Mexico by endeavouring to create a mandatory occupational 
retirement benefit program administered by the private sector (McCallum, 
1988; Borzutzky, 1990; Ryser, 1992; Santamaria, 1992). The Patten 
administration's aspiration is, however, to build upon, through integration, 
the coverage achieved by extant voluntary occupational provident funds. 
The alternative might be to establish a new mandatory occupational 
retirement savings program that would fill the coverage gap left by the 
voluntary occupational provident funds. This would mean that members of 
existing private provident funds could be exempted from the mandatory 
program's coverage, although they could be given the right to select into it if 
they consider its benefits to be superior to those offered by their own 
voluntary occupational provident fund. The contracting out of the 
mandatory program's administration to one or lTIOre private occupational 
provident funds could still take place. This could solve thorny policy and 
legal issues in rela tion to existing contractual obliga tions tha t might 
othenvise have implications for the statutory imposition of any minimum 
program requirements and perhaps for instituting portability between 
constituent private provident funds. 
What follows is an attempt to articulate a design agenda for a 
mandatory occupational retirement savings program. This has been done 
on the basis that making mandatory membership of what were previously 
voluntary occupational provident funds places a responsibility on 
government to ensure that its aged income support objectives (what ever 
they may be) are cost-effectively achieved by the articulation of minimum 
program requirement that would be common to all constituent private 
provident funds. This is not to suggest, however, that diversity is not 
important. Rather, it is a reflection on the fact that the Patten 
administration, in the Hong Kong tradition, is creating a profitable regulated 
market for the private sector to exploit, thus necessitating the need for a 
regulatory regime that ensures that public policy goals and private profit 
goals do not become incongruous or even incompatible. 
Program Coverage 
The program design questions relating to coverage that need to be 
addressed are: 
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• Should all industries be covered? If not, which industries 
should be exempt from coverage and upon what basis should 
any such exemptions be granted (for example, intensity of 
international competition)? 
• Should all employers be covered? If not, which type of 
employers should be exempt from coverage and upon "\t\lhat 
basis should any such exemptions be granted (for example, 
those with less than five employees)? 
• Should all occupational groups be covered? If not, "\t\lhich 
occupational groups should be exempt from coverage and 
upon what basis should any such exemptions be granted (for 
example, professionals (such as lawyers and medical 
practitioners), civil servants and domestic servants)? 
• Should all em ployees be covered? If not, "\t\l hich type of 
employees should be exempt frOlTI coverage and upon what 
basis should any such exemptions be granted (for example, 
casual employees , junior employees , apprentices , casual 
employees , temporary employees, fixed-period contract 
employees with no right of abode in Hong Kong, employees 
in equivalent private plans administered outside Hong 
Kong, employees earning less than a specified minimum 
income (as distinct from the specification of a contribution 
floor) , and employees earning more than a specified 
maximum income (as distinct from the specification of a 
contribution ceiling))? 
• 
• 
Should the self-employed be required to participate? 
• If yes, "\t\lhat rate of contribution should they pay? 
• If not, should voluntary participation be permitted? 
Should voluntary participation be open to any person 
yvho is not required to contribute? 
Should coverage extend to Hong Kong residents with a right 
of abode who are employed outside Hong Kong by Hong 
Kong-based em ployers? 
The responses to these questions "\t\lill determine the degree of program 
coverage achieved. This will determine the extent to which the social 
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assistance system will be relieved of a financial burden in the future. Not 
addressed, of course, is the fundamental question of what aged income 
support should be available to those outside covered employment. 
Withdrawal Contingencies 
The program design questions relating to the contingencies that will 
perrr吐t the withdrawal of accumulated net savings are: 
What should be the designated eligibility age? Should it be 
the same for men and women? If not, w ha t should the 
differential be? 
• Should resignation or termination of covered employment 
be a withdrawal contingency? 
• 
• If yes, should the withdra\vn savings be subject to any 
tax liability? 
If yes, at what rate(s)? Should tax deferral until 
retirement from any employment, or full or 
partial tax exemption, be granted if the withdra\vn 
savings are rolled over into a retirement savings 
account (that is , an account with a financial 
institution that is not accessible until the 
attainment of designated age without the payment 
of the tax liability due) or used to purchase a 
retirement annuity? 
• If not, should the threat of taxation be used to 
encourage the rolling over of the withdrawn funds 
into a retirement savings account or the purchase 
of a retirement annuity? 
Should retirement from any employment at the designated 
age be a withdrawal eligibility condition? 
• If yes, should early retirement be permitted for any 
employees? If yes, how many years earlier? In which 
industries should covered employees be permitted to 
retire early (for example, dangerous or hazardous 
industries)? 
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• If not, should the withdrawn savings be subject to any 
tax liability? 
• If yes, at what rate(s)? Should tax deferral until 
retirement from any employment, or full or partial 
tax exemption, be granted if the withdrawn savings 
are rolled over into a retirement savings account 
or used to purchase a retirement annui ty? 
• If not, should the threat of taxation be used to 
encourage the rolling over of the withdrawn funds 
into a retirement savings account or the purchase 
of a retirement annuity? 
• Should death be a \vithdravval contingency? 
• If yes, who should be permitted to be the beneficiary? 
• 
Any individual nominated by a covered employees? 
The covered employees': 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
legal spouses and dependant children only? 
訂戶cto spouses and their dependant children? 
dependant siblings? 
dependant parents? 
other dependant relatives? 
other dependant individuals (for example, for 
indi vid uals in long-standing homosexual 
relationships)? If yes, should there be a consent 
provision? 
Should the distribution of the accumulated savings 
amongst designated or designated beneficiaries be 
determined by statute? 
Should the withdrawn savings be subject to any tax 
liability? If yes, at what rate(s)? 
If not, how should the accumulated savings be 
distributed? 
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• Should the complete or partial withdrawal of accumulated 
savings be permi位ed in the event of: 
• permanent emigration by residents with the right of 
abode in Hong Kong? If yes , how is permanent 
emigration established? 
• permanent departure by fixed-period contract employees 
with no right of abode in Hong Kong? 
permanent total or partial incapacity or invalidity 
(beyond a specified degree) at any age or after a 
designa ted age? 
• unemployment of more than a specified minimum 
period or after a designated age? 
• permanent retirement from covered employment at 
any age or after a specified minimum period of 
contribution? 
• marriage and pernlanent retirement from covered 
enlployment by women? 
If yes , should the vvithdrawn savings in any of these 
circumstances be subject to any tax liability? If yes, at what 
rate(s)? 
• Should borrovving up to a specified proportion of the 
accumulated savings, with or without the payment of 
interest, be permitted for, say: 
• home purchase? 
social obligations (such as marriages and funerals)? 
• children's education? 
• medical and hospital care? 
The responses to these questions wiU determine the extent to which the 
mandatory occupational retirement savings program will provide even 
modest material support for retired covered employees. The dilemma is 
that since contributors are able to identify their mandatory savings they are 
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inclined to claim proprietary rights over them. This brings into focus the 
libertarian principle that since individuals should be considered the best 
judges of their well being, they should be able to use, perhaps within limits, 
"their" mandatory savings to improve their immediate 11 quality of life", 
which is a principle that has been accepted by all national provident funds 
(Dixon, 1993). 
Not addressed, of course is whether and how society should provide 
income support to those mandatory occupational retirement savings 
program beneficiaries who choose not to use the lump-sum payment for the 
income圓support purposes they were intended: 
• Should lump-sum payment beneficiaries be designated as 
ineligible for social assistance? 
• 
• If yes, should ineligibility apply 0叫Y if their withdrawn 
savings are above a designated minimum level? For 
how long, or to what age, should they remain 
ineligible? 
• If not, how should the withdrawal benefits, especially 
any non-income-earning assets purchased from those 
proceeds, be treated under the social assistance means 
test? Should such beneficiaries be prohibited from 
divesting themselves of any income and assets they 
have gained from the withdrawn savings so as to 
qualify for social assistance? 
Should it be mandatory for all or part of a withdravval benefit 
resulting from a covered employee's death or attairunent of a 
designated age be used to purchase of an acceptable annuity? 
The responses to these questions \vill determine the extent to which the 
social assistance system will be relieved of a financial burden in the future. 
Program Financing 
The program design questions relating to the method of financing that 
need to be addressed are: 
• Should contribution rates for employees and employers be 
identical? If not, what should the differential be? 
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• Should participating employers be able to make additional 
voluntary contributions? If yes, upon what basis? Regular 
supplementary contributions? Ad hoc contributions? 
• Should covered employees be able to make additional 
voluntary contributions? If yes, upon what basis? Regular 
supplementary contributions? Ad hoc contributions? 
• Should a contribution floor be specified, as distinct from the 
exemption of lower-income employees from coverage? If 
yes , what should the contribution floor be? Should 
en1ployers alone be required to make contributions with 
respect to covered employees whose contribution liability 
falls belo\v the contribution floor? 
• Should a contribution ceiling be specified, as distinct from 
the exemption of higher-income en1ployees from coverage? 
If yes, \vhat should the contribution ceiling be? 
• 
How should "income" be defined for the purposes of 
calculating the contribution liability? Should it only inc1ude 
earned cash income? Should it be gross taxable income 
(before permitted deductions) or net taxable income? Should 
it inc1 ude cash bonus, overtime or other special and one-off 
payments? Should additional employment benefits (such as 
allowances for housing, travel, education and clothing) be 
included? 
Should employees with multiple jobs in covered 
employment be subject to multiple contribution liabilities? If 
not, how is the contribution liability determined? 
• Should governrnent make a contribution: 
• 
• as an employer? 
• to augment the contributions made by (or on behalf of) 
employees below a designated contribution floor? 
• towards administrative costs? 
Should government act as a financial guarantor of the 
program? If yes, how should the investment behaviour of 
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the constituent private provident funds be regulated to 
ensure that they do not increase the risk-yield profile of their 
investments in the face their own reduced cost of risk? 
• Should basic employers' contributions (and/or any permitted 
supplementary contributions) be deductible from taxable 
income in the year paid or trea ted as a tax credi t? 
• Should the employees' contribution (and/or any permitted 
supplementary contributions) be deductible from taxable 
income in the year paid or treated as a tax credit? 
• Should constituent private provident funds be subject to 
income and other tax liabilities? 
The responses to these questions \-v ill determine in part the complex 
economic impact that mandatory occupational retirement savings programs 
have on their host economies. 
Mandatory occupational retirement savings programs certainly 
mobilise savings, although they will only increase savings if the mandatory 
savings does not induce a corresponding reduction in voluntary savings. 
The gro\-v th in revenue (contributions plus investment and another 
income) grea tl y exceed the growth in expendi tures (benefi ts pl us 
adlninistrative expenses) thus ensuring an accumulation of investment 
funds by the constituent private provident funds . This is inevitable because 
under a mandatory occupational retirement savings programs contributions 
are collected for a considerable period before significant benefits payments 
are lnade. Of course the extent to which interim withdrawals and borrowing 
rights are permitted will diminish the rate of which these investment funds 
are accumulated. The manner in which they are used is determined by any 
constraints specified in its enabling statute, by the institutional arrangements 
surrounding the investment decision-making process, and by the prevailing 
political attitudes towards the appropriate socio-economic role of the 
mandatory occupational retirement savings program. 
The distributional impact of mandatory occupational retirement 
savings programs is extremely difficult to determine, but hvo issues need to 
be highlighted. First, with a progressive income tax rate structure, the 
distributional impact of tax-deductible employee contributions is regressive. 
(The degree of regressivity is, of course, restricted when a contribution 
ceilings is specified.) Second, because the investment of the accumulated 
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savings by constituent private provident funds has effects throughout the 
economy in which it operates, it has a bevvilderingly complex impact on the 
distributions of income. There is no a priori way of knowing whether this 
impact is generally progressive, neutral or regressive, or even which 
segments of the community are the principal beneficiaries. 
Program Administration 
The program design questions relating to the program administration 
that need to be addressed are: 
• What legal form should the constituent private provident 
funds take? Should they be legal entities created under: 
• the enabling statute (such as statutory joint ventures 
betvveen the government and one or more private 
provident funds)? 
• 
• 
the prevailing corporations statute? 
another relevant statutes (such as that covering the 
activities of life insurance companies)? 
• Should there be any statutory constraints on entry into the 
private provident fund industry (such as the payment of a 
bond, acceptable financial and governance structures, or an 
acceptable ownership structure)? 
• 
• 
• 
Should there be an y constraints on the insti tutional 
management (for example, covered employee representation 
on the governing boards of constituent private provident 
funds)? 
Should there be mandatory covered employee participation 
in contribution, benefit and investment policy decision 
making? 
What, if any, financial management constraints should be 
imposed upon constituent private provident funds (for 
example, mandatory investments (such as government 
securities), prohibited investments (such as commodity 
futures, derivatives, investments outside Hong Kong) and 
other prohibited financial transactions (such as loans to 
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employees or loans to parent, subsidiary or associated 
corporate entities)? 
• Should covered employees' have their accumulated savings 
held in separate trust accounts in their own individual 
names? 
• Should there be a publicly-administered appeal process to 
adjudicate contribution liability and payment disputes 
between the constituent private provident funds and their 
covered employees and/or their participating emp1oyers? If 
not, does existing statue 1aw provide sufficient remedies to 
protect the rights of covered emp10yees and participating 
emp10yers in the event of such disputes? 
What be specified for the purpose of publicly assessing the 
performance of constituent private provident funds? 
• What shou1d be the statutory right-of-access by covered 
emp10yees to information stored by the constituent private 
provident funds? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
What confidentiality of information shou1d be guaranteed by 
statute? 
What shou1d be the statutory auditing requirements? 
What statutory public accountability disclosure (reporting) 
requirements shou1d apply to the constituent private 
provident funds (such as, disc10sure of administrative fees 
and charges, uncollected contributions, investment portfo1io 
details, rate of return achieved on investments, investments 
in or 10ans to parent, subsidiary or associated companies, and 
the average, minimum and maximum time taken to process 
withdrawa1 applications)? 
What statutory records shou1d constituent private provident 
funds be obliged to keep and for how 10ng (for examp1e, 
covered emp10yee contribution records)? 
• Should a benchmark administrative cost schedule be 
specified in the enab1ing statute for the purpose of public1y 
18 
assessing the performance of constituent private provident 
funds? 
• ，久That should be the statutory right-of-access by covered 
employees to information stored by the constituent private 
provident funds? 
• What confidentiality of information should be guaranteed by 
statute? 
What should be the statutory auditing requirements? 
﹒叭That statutory sanctions, at the corporate and responsible-
individual level, should government have in the event of: 
• 
• 
• the management of a constituent private provident 
fund acting contrary to the interests of contributing 
employees (such as making false or deceptive 
statements, failing to disc10sure re1evant information or 
destroying re1evant documents)? 
• an en1p1oyee of a constituent private provident fund 
causing a financial 10ss by acting illegally (such as 
engaging in theft or fraud)? 
What shou1d the statutory winding-up provisions be for 
constituent private provident funds that are unab1e to meet 
their financial obligations? 
What po\vers shou1d be vested in the public regu1atory body 
vvith respect to: 
• 
• 
• 
accessing contribution and benefit records, and policy 
and administration files held by constituent private 
provident funds? 
undertaking periodic reviews of the management and 
operation of constituent private provident funds? 
accessing data from constituent private provident funds 
for the purpose conducting studies and surveys? 
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The response to these questions wiU determine, in effect, the 1eve1 of pub1ic 
trust and confidence in the envisioned mandatory occupationa1 retirement 
savlngs program. 
CONCLUSION 
Mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings programs, like that 
envisioned by the Patten administration, seek to provide retired covered 
emp10yees \vith income support in the form of the withdrawa1 of their 
accumu1ated net savings upon attaining a designated retirement age. Their 
capacity to provide adequate income support to the aged is generally 
restricted, first, by the re1ative1y slow rate of savings accumu1ation (in terms 
of potentia1 income rep1acement); second, by their inability to ensure that 
1ump-sum payments are used by their beneficiaries to provide 10ng-term 
income support; and finally, by their inability to provide their beneficiaries 
\vith a hedge against inflation. The fundamenta1 di1emma is thus that 
adequate aged income support caIU10t be achieved on the basis of mandatory 
savings a1one. 
The additional challenges facing the Patten administration's 1atest aged 
income support reform strategy, which in effect creates a profitable regulated 
market for the private sector to exp1oit, relate to the need to develop a 
regulatory regime that ensures that its aged income support policy goa1s 
(whatever they may be) do not become subservient to the profit goals of the 
private provident funds. This requires the articulation of a set of desired 
mandatory program features (embracing coverage , withdrawal 
contingencies, contributions) and administrative arrangements (embracing, 
lega1 entity issues, institutiona1 governance issues, reporting and dis c10sure 
issues, and probity issues). 
The Patten administration wiU a1so have to address how it intends to to 
harmonise the constituent parts of Hong Kong's socia1 security system so as 
to avoid exp1oitation of the socia1 assistance system by avaricious mandatory 
savings beneficiaries, perhaps to the disadvantage of those who depend 
upon socia1 assistance because they are either not covered or inadequately 
protected by the mandatory occupationa1 retirement savings program. 
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